Looking at Bergson’s notion of time he explains that there are two types of time. Quantative, being the spacial measurement of it, and Qualitative which is the ‘real’ time and individual experience.
What interests me is how he would respond to someone who has experienced “déjà vu”, and more importantly “Tripping Out”. Both I imagine are fairly similar experiences physically, “Tripping out” being much more intense, but your experience of time changes here, alongside this there is the importance of memory in this kind of experience. Bergson argues the idea that our memories are constantly shaping our decisions, but if you are “Tripping Out” I think you don’t have that memory, and once you realise that everything you are experiencing, you have experienced before you stop “Tripping Out”. I know it may seem quite out there, and irrelevant. But I wonder whether he would just note this as a neurological experience or a Qualitative experience, if it is the same experience, over and over again. I’m not too sure on what actually happens in the mind through this type of experience but in my opinion, it is the same experience that you experience multiple times until your mind ‘moves forward’ again so to speak.
Any thoughts?
Alicia Hylton N0217828
Thanks Alica, for a good and very thoughtful post. I think you hit on a very interesting way of bringing Bergson to everyday life. Hmm, let me see what Bergson would say about déjà vu. Déjà vu at its most basic level implies a repetition of the past. That is to say I have been there and done that. I guess on the most elementary level it would confirm his idea of time. If time is one unified flow then there is no absolute break with the past, only individual intensifications of past experiences. In this sense we might be able to explain déjà vu in the sense that it presents, not a direct repetition of a past experience but a virtual intensive experience of the past. Everything is always new and creative for Bergson, so therefore déjà vu is not the direct re-living of a past experience but a virtual or proximate simulation of a past experience.
ReplyDeleteWith regard to tripping out presents another problem that might not be as easily explainable. If we ‘trip-out’ then I think the question is whether this creates a necessary break or rupture with past experience. If this is the case then we have segmentation and spatialisation and all of the things that Bergson does not like. But if memory stops it stops. It becomes a question of degree, does it stop absolutely, a lot or a little.
In another sense the question of trauma would be an interesting phenomenon to think of here. The idea that a very painful and horrific event has been forgotten which keeps re-surfacing over and over again. I think this is both qualitative and neurological. Neurological in the sense that it is wholly a bodily and nervous experience, and qualitative in the sense that it presents a very immediate subjective simulation in the present of the past.
What do you think Alicia?
Déjà vu from my understanding happens over a fraction of a second, and there could be several explanations for it. However, Bergson’s analogies of time, the tape rolling and the colour spectrum for instance, suggest you cannot experience the same moment twice. Given the fact you are 'experiencing' déjà vu itself at that given moment, you are not experiencing the same moment. You are a aware of something you were not aware of when you last experienced that moment. Therefore, a change has taken place and the moment is no longer the 'same'.
ReplyDeleteAs for 'tripping-out' and the change in the experience of time, I would suggest this aligns itself quite nicely with Bergson's conception of the qualitative nature of pure time. It becomes another demonstration of its non-mechanistic nature.
Finally, Patrick, after reading your entry you mention a 'break' or 'rupture' with past experience. Does Bergson suggest we should have full access to all of our memories at any given moment? The blocking of painful memories still effects our day to day. An experience has taken place, despite the repression of that experience. What I am asking is, is there really segmentation and spatialisation taking place?
I understand your views on deja vu Shane, as clearly it is a different experience if you realise you're experiencing deja vu, and its quite in line with Bergson's theory.
ReplyDeleteWith regards with 'tripping out' I think that it is important to note that euphoric or traumatic experiences can alter time perception. For example, taking a drug, which in turn 'trips you out' I think is due to the euphoric elements of that drug (most common reason people take drugs is to get that high) which i think is perfectly aligned with Bergson on Qualitive time. Euphoric exeriences I think are exactly what Bergson regarded as Qualitive time, rather than being rational, breaking time up etc. Opposite end of the spectrum is trauma, sometimes its suppressed, sometimes its re-lived in nightmares for example. Both dealings with trauma naturally have an impact on the present life be it explicitly or unconsciously.
Another point I think is relevant to 'tripping-out' is the concept of dreams. Clearly, we have no concept of time in our dreams, so in that sense I would suggest its Qualitive. But as you said Bergson said we could not have any breaks from the past I think dreams are an example of this, because there are often underlining messages and they reflect our desires, worries etc. But when we are dreaming, I don't think we necessarily have access to our memories, but they do influence our actions, who we speak to in our dreams and what we're doing for example. And I think 'tripping out' is very similar to this, a conscious, dream-like state, a state that no one should ever be in while awake! When we dream, we never notice the oddities until we are awake and we suddenly realise that we were talking to a donkey or something. To 'trip-out' is an oddity in conscious life, but if we 'tripped-out' in our dreams, I don't think we would notice. And whilst we are dreaming our body is at its most relaxed which links to the euphoric state given by a drug. Or even when drunk, I think the body receives that euphoric high and time changes dramatically to the point you could wake up and not remember anything.
Thanks Alicia. I think that you have managed to put even more detail on the question of 'qualitative time; and euphoria. I can see why you draw the parallel. A euphoric experience is one I think which would be very directed, intense and which 'tinges' everything else with its quality. There would thus be no room for a rational segmentation since everything would take on the 'hue' of that experience. Indeed the reason something is euphoric is precisely because it is exceptional and transgresses every day run of the mill life to such an extent that the bits and pieces and segmented aspects of that life are co-ordinated in terms of the experience.
ReplyDeleteWith regard your question Shane, I think for Bergson the rupture is there but it is not a radical one. There is no essential rupture between past and present, only one of intensity. So say your experience of the now would be more intensive than past, but the past, and hence memory would inform the present but only by a question of degree rather than in terms of an absolute separation.
From what I just read that ties in well with the euphoria you previously mentioned.
ReplyDeleteThanks.