Shane Russell:N0242275
The foundation of Henri Bergson’s philosophy is built upon his conception of Time. Henri Bergson categorises time into two distinct forms: pure time (la durée) and numerical or mathematical time. Pure time is real duration, which is ‘synonymous with existence[1]’. Mathematical time is merely measurable duration, a mechanistic unit. As a predicate of the classification of time into distinct forms, the result is concepts with different properties. Pure time is continuous and indivisible; which is in direct contrast with numerical time, which is divisible into representable units. However, representable units do not reflect the flow of real experienced time.
The ordinary conception of numerical time born out of science is, for Bergson, a false model; it ‘is strictly conceived by human intelligence’[2]. The problem with this notion of time for Bergson is that it is being viewed by way of our reflective consciousness as space, and space is homogenous. To use Space and Time interchangeably is to apply the same transposable characteristics. Therefore, like space, time would be viewed as a homogenous medium without limits. The quandary this notion proposes is that homogeneity consists of being without qualities, and therefore it becomes complex in distinguishing one homogeneity from another.
Real time is heterogeneous in character and is therefore fundamentally different from space. For Bergson we are aware of pure time in relation to ourselves, as it has a non-spatial relationship to multiplicity; this is because real time’s affiliation is to conscious states and not corporeal entities. Real time –la durée- is also not susceptible like false time to measurement, for it is qualitative and not quantitative in nature. This is a poignant anti-mechanistic proposal by Bergson, as the proposition is that real time cannot be measured, and does not need to be, as duration is experience of conscious states.
Thanks Shane: This is a very precise and accurate account of Bergson’s idea of time. I think you are quite right in drawing attention to the quandary of homogeneity and a being without qualities. Homogeneity is precisely without qualities in the sense that there can only be sameness, hence there is no affectation, difference and thus no content [barring perhaps one]. If I could press you a little, how would you think we can think of pure time or duration without at least a minimal degree of sameness. It seems that Bergson’s thought, comes across as monistic, which is to say that reality is made of one substance. This is necessary if reality is indivisible. If it becomes divisible it is therefore segmented, spatialized and open. Is Bergson’s radical distinction between time and space possible? Furthermore, if this is the case how might we have any qualities
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