In The Postmodern Condition: A report on knowledge Jean-Francoise Lyotard generates for us a definition of postmodernity. This definition is based on the way that highly technologised, post-industrial societies produce knowledge. He marks clearly, first the difference between narrative and scientific forms of knowledge and second how different societies have responded to these forms of knowledge.
The difference, he says, is that narrative forms of knowledge are self legitimating because of their structure and so can maintain integrity. Scientific knowledge on the other hand, questions the legitimacy of statements within it’s own structure. For this reason scientific knowledge must turn to narrative knowledge for legitimation.
Postmodern societies, Lyotard says, are those that hold an “incredulity towards metanarratives” [1]. What this means is that these societies typically posses a more subjective view of knowledge than a modern metanarrative can support. For example the story of the liberation of the people through the acquisition of knowledge, or the enlightenment ideal of knowledge for its own sake. These ideas no longer hold up.
In place of this we now legitimate knowledge through its performativity. This is perhaps better explained by the efficiency or economy of its utility. Knowledge becomes simple data, only valued by what use can be made of it. This can be seen embodied in the internet, which contains an enormous amount of free information and so has a high performativity value and has permeated every sinew of contemporary society.
References
1. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge Jean-Françoise Lyotard (Manchester 1984)
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Thanks Rob. Splendid. You have given a succinct account of Lyotard. In many ways this is a huge part of Lyotards work. In terms of science, I think there is something to this. Heidegger was I think right in criticising the nihilistic capacities of technology, or technologised science, but Lyotard I think brings it a bit further by demonstrating a deficit of ‘thought’ in science. This is not to say of course than scientists do not think, they most certainly do, but that the representations of science must resort to some self-expression in order to ground knowledge. The basic most important point about this I guess is that science far from being permanently the arbiter of neutral and true knowledge can be wholly technologised, and thus, also, ideologised.
ReplyDeleteAny thoughts?
Ever the sycophant, I couldn't agree more! It seems the only scientific experience that is contemporarily relevant is a technological one.
ReplyDeleteI understand that Lyotard sees this as a systemic or structural problem, to do with how we generate scientific knowledge, but when he goes on to say that lamenting this epistemological shift away from meaningful knowledge is just nostalgic nonsense, he denies a return to narrative knowledge without giving a reason. Or at least none better than the proliferation of high, information, technologies.
I think I see what Dom was banging on about in the lecture the other week, I may have to give One Dimensional Man a whirl!